the Civil Human Rights Front in the struggle against Article 23 and its role in the subsequent democracy movement showed the limitations of the new stage of movement and its movement form.
The coming of the social movement industry
As discussed in Chapter One, the dominant paradigm for Hong Kong studies mostly took the colonial state as autonomous from societal influence. The influential works of Lau (1984) and King (1975) took political stability amidst rapid industrialization and the absence of challenges to colonial rule as their starting point, as the major "anomaly" that they sought to explain. Both Images I and II of the colonial state discussed in Chapter One saw civil society as weak or even non-existent, with government policies during the early colonial era largely the result of choices of autonomous state actors.
As Chiu and Hung (1999) pointed out, these early sociologists had a "high threshold of instability"; any collective action that fell short of fundamentally challenging colonial rule would be seen as insignificant. Focused on explaining social and political stability, these scholars overlooked the diverse forms of grassroots protests and resistance movements (Lui and Chiu, 2000, pp. 5-6) . More detailed studies of postwar Hong Kong revealed that there were significant social and political movements from society, with China, the colonial government or private institutions as the prime targets (Lam, 2004, pp. 53-64) . These movements varied in terms of scale, publicity, and intensity. They included movements seeking change in government policies (e.g., campaign against rent control, campaign to change marriage laws), industrial action (e.g., tram workers' strike), outbursts of violence with political and nationalist underpinnings (e.g., the 1956 and 1967 riots), and campaigns against private corporations (e.g., against rise of telephone tariffs). Lam (2004, p. 59) counted 212 and 137 events of political action in the decades 1949-59 and 1960-69 respectively, a not insignificant figure even if compared with those of the 1970s and beyond. Studies on postwar rural stability showed that the colonial government actively managed its relationship with the rural leaders through the Heung Yee Kuk (Chiu and Hung, 1997 & 1999) . Industrial conflicts were far from absent, although the trade union movement had only a marginal influence at the workplace, industry and society levels (Lui and Chiu, 2000, p. 6; England and Rear, 1975; Turner et al., 1980) . These studies all pointed to significant political participation from civil society during the early postwar years.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there was relatively little conventional political participation by the masses and civil society organizations before the 1970s. As Lam pointed out, participation before the 1970s was mostly discursive in terms of strategies, actions and channels of influence (Lam, 2004, p. 221) . The actions included public violence (the 1956 and 1967 riots) , conventional labor union action (the beginning of the 1952 Tramway workers' dispute), public petition (the campaign to change marriage law), and lobbying of legislators and government officials (the campaign to change marriage law). There were no designated institutions of participation, as the formal channels (such as Exco, Legco and the UC) were mostly used for co-option of elites, not for voluntary participation from the civil society. Restrictive public order legislation and high-handed control on public meetings also discouraged the public's participation in collective action.
The rise of social and pressure group movements in the 1970s was the result of a number of factors. Politically, the emphasis on "consultative democracy" by the colonial government in the 1970s led to better tolerance of social protests and petitions, creating a "political opportunity structure" that encouraged political participation (Lui and Chiu, 2000, p. 7) . The economic take-off and social reforms in the 1970s meant that the fruits of development were finally trickling down to the lower class, which encouraged more demands for social improvement. Socially, there was a distinct gap between the quality of social services provided by the government and the needs and desires of the local residents, creating extra demands for social reform (Lui and Kung, 1985, p. 72) . Demographically, while before the 1970s Hong Kong was largely a refugee society, the 1970s saw the rise of a new class of educated youth, born or brought up in the territory and showing a better sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and were more eager to correct the ills of the colonial regime. This generation of youth spearheaded the social movement in the 1970s, with university student movements setting the pace for future social movements. Culturally a Hong Kong identity was beginning to emerge. The disturbances of the 1960s led to a resuscitation of the young generation on the future and the identity of Hong Kong (Lui, 1997a) . The government also began to engineer some community building. The enhanced international recognition of the PRC, including the normalization of the PRC-US relationship and the entry of the PRC to the United Nations, stirred nationalist sentiments in the territory. The movements in the early 1970s thus had a distinct nationalist and anti-colonial flavor.
The social movements in the 1970s, in this sense, marked a vital period of community-and identity-building (Lui, 2002) and mutual engagement between state and society. The politics and movements in Hong Kong were no longer an extension of the mainland political conflicts, but were political actions directed against the colonial state aimed at improving living standards. Social reforms and real improvements in livelihood also instilled hopes in the new generation, who now saw the colonial regime as at least reformable. Mobilization of grassroots movements and participation through collective action actually helped to mold the citizen status of Hong Kong people, and gave rise to a new form of state-society relations.
The 1970s' movements were a confluence of various sentiments and concerns, fermented within the local civil society at the time. It started with movements with nationalist flavors such as the Protection of the Diaoyu Islands Movement and the movement to make Chinese the official language in the early 1970s. These movements more or less had anti-colonial implications, as did the social movements directed against colonial injustices, the most representative being the anti-corruption/anti-Godber movement in 1973-74. As housing has been a key issue of concern in the densely populated Hong Kong, the residents' movements at neighborhood level played a prominent role in the urban social movements in the 1970s to 80s (Lui and Kung, 1985, p. 5) . Adopting social movement theories of Alinsky, the residents' movement of this stage used professional community organizers to train and organize leaders, mobilize residents by community issues, and use social protest actions to force government into negotiations (Fung, 1990) . The movements ranged from demanding improvement of facilities in public housing and squatter areas, to demanding resettlement, to more progressive demands to housing policy. A study of social conflicts in 1975-86 showed that housing was the second most common area of conflict, only after labor conflicts (Cheung and Louie, 2000, p. 70) . The study also showed that workers, unionists, residents, and community activists were frequently involved in the social conflicts of this period (Cheung and Louie, 2000, p. 89) .
The social movements of the 1970s allowed the movement groups to accumulate experience and resources and stimulated the awareness of citizens. The advantage of the Alinsky model was that it did not require a lot of resources, and did not require a change of the power configuration of the political system. It stressed empowerment of the masses by stimulating awareness and participation, and did not need the intermediation of other political actors. There was a major limitation, however. With the undemocratic nature of the colonial regime, and the limitations of "consultative democracy," the social movements in the 1970s and 1980s could seldom mobilize enough political resources to change government policy. This had two effects on the direction of the movement in this period and on subsequent movements. Firstly, with little actual institutional means to change government policy, the activists had to rely on mobilizing public opinion to put pressure on the government. Collective action and street-level protests were the major means of attracting media coverage, earning public sympathy and embarrassing the government. This constrained the form and actions adopted by the movements: as earning public sympathy was the key to success, activists were usually loath to take radical or confrontational actions (Luk, 1994, p. 41) .
Secondly, the lack of formal institutional power at the early stage made the activists see the limited local elections that started in the mid-1980s as a good window of opportunity to increase their political leverage. Many social activists, including professional social workers, ran in the DB and UC/RC elections in the 1980s and participated actively in the democracy movement in the 1980s. To them, the democracy movement, by demanding the opening of the political regime and the sharing of political power, was a natural sequel of the broader social movement that started in the 1970s. The 1980s thus saw social and political movements on various fronts. At the neighborhood level, residents' movements boomed with the help of NLCDP resources (see Chapter Seven). At the political level, social and community activists began to share some institutional power through being elected into DBs and the UC/RC. Livelihood concern groups ( ) were formed as grassroots movement groups that covered wider localities. At the societal level, the reform forces invariably joined hands on territory-wide movements in the form of ad hoc coalitions.
As Lui and Chiu (2000) pointed out, the pressure groups at this stage had little difficulty in joining together to form ad hoc organizations for a common cause. Despite their ideological differences and different concern areas, the CSOs were all reformist in nature, and saw various social movements as parts of a larger movement of decolonization and regime reform. The limited political opportunities and common experience of fighting against a bureaucratic, closed, colonial administrative state drove them together (Lui and Chiu, 2000, p. 9) . Cases in point would be the movement to shelve the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant in 1986, and the movement against the amendment of the Public Order Ordinance in 1987. In theory, both were incidents in particular issue-areas: one was an environmental issue and another mostly one of human rights or freedom of speech. But 117 pressure groups from various sectors joined hands to form the Joint Conference for the Shelving of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant in 1986. Similarly, the government's proposal to amend the Public Order Ordinance to make publishing false news an offence led to an opposition coalition of CSOs comprising religious groups, political groups and other community groups (see Ma, 1999; Scott, 1989, pp. 309-316) .
CSOs at this stage also showed better integration and coordination between community groups from different districts, and between CSOs and the emerging political society. For example, the People's Council on Public Housing Policy (PCPHP) was a pressure group that organized neighborhood associations in different districts in the 1970s and 1980s. It also actively fielded candidates in the DB and UC/RC elections in the 1980s. The mid-1980s also saw the mushrooming of livelihood concern groups in different districts, which usually had links with elected DB members. These groups linked together neighborhood associations in the same district to voice opinions on issues in the community. NLCDP workers invariably formed the crux of many of these groups (Leung, J., 1990, p. 16) . A survey by the Hong Kong Council of Social Service showed that 25-26 such concern groups were formed in 1985-86. Most of them had a small membership, with social workers as core members, and they usually used social surveys, petitions and lobbying to address community grievances, and actively participated in local consultative bodies such as the district boards and district committees (Leung, J., 1988, p. 17) .
However, these livelihood concern groups were largely short-lived. By the early 1990s they showed they had limited mobilization power. The livelihood concern groups also drove a wedge between the residents' associations such as MACs and the elected politicians. These groups sometimes became the vehicles of electoral politicians or political groups/parties, which invariably competed for movement resources with the residents' groups at the local level. Gradually residents' groups were wary that they would be exploited or absorbed by the politicians and lose their own identity or autonomy (Lui, 1994) . As discussed in Chapter Six, this gradually created a gap between the grassroots CSOs and the political society in the 1990s.
New movements since the 1990s
As discussed in Chapter Six, the 1990s saw a gradual detachment of the political from the civil society in Hong Kong. This had to do with new trends of development within the social movement industry, with a gradually widening ideological gap between the political parties and the CSOs, and with the CSOs' disappointment with both the performance and political effectiveness of the elected legislators in the 1990s. These several factors, however, were mutually reinforcing, leading to new forms of social movement in the 1990s and beyond.
New social movements
When the district boards were first set up in the 1980s, many social activists saw participation in the DB elections as "wars of position" (Public Policy Research Center, 1985) that were vital to the future development of democracy and social movements in Hong Kong. To these activists, the DB seats represented institutional resources and influences that had never been opened for competition before, which could be used to push for more social and political reforms. Hence CSOs in the 1980s commonly saw it both desirable and necessary to participate in the limited elections in that period. They believed that with elected legislators and DB members, social mobilization could bring greater pressure on the government and better effect changes with their allies in the establishment.
After 1991, the CSOs quickly discovered that the power of the limited representative democracy was a myth. Limited to a minority in most of the elected councils, the pro-democracy politicians could not bring as many policy changes as they had expected. Electoral politicians also had a different set of preferences or incentives after they became elected legislators, politicians were more constrained by mainstream public opinion, and were more bent on compromise with both the establishment and other groups. As popularly elected legislators they were also loath to support the more radical or confrontational actions of some grassroots CSOs. This, coupled with the trend of "new social movement" in the social movement industry in the early 1990s, sped up the detachment of CSOs with political parties.
The early 1990s saw the rise of "new social movements" among CSOs. These stressed more thorough discussions about the goals and courses of action and collective decisions among the participants, with the professional organizers taking a less dominant role. They valued equality between the organizers and the masses, with a view that the masses, and not the professional activists, were the true subjects of movements. They stressed direct dialogue between the masses and those in power, often with the help of more confrontational actions, doing away with the mediation of politicians or mass media. To these activists, the direct confrontation and dialogue would lead to a fundamental resuscitation of the power relationship within the society among the participants (Luk, 1994; Mok and Yu, 1996) . This trend was due to several developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the subsequent debate on the future political formula had turned the attention of Hong Kong people, and in particular the mass media, towards constitutional rather than livelihood issues. It was more and more difficult for actions on social policy issues to attract attention and to arouse public sympathy. Secondly, the development of elected councils since the 1980s absorbed a lot of political participation and drove the masses to become more reliant on professional politicians to channel their interests, which had a negative impact on political participation. However, after the DB and Legco elections social activists quickly found out that the elected politicians were not that effective in influencing government policy after all, and may not accurately reflect the interests of the citizens once they were in the councils. They also found that the media had their own biases and agendas, which could not be relied upon to articulate the interests of the grassroots (Luk, 1994) . As a response to these changes, the new social movement activists saw the need to rejuvenate the social movement by emphasizing more initiatives and participation of the masses to empower them. They also believed that direct action confronting the authorities could transcend the limitations of the media and elected politicians.
Ideologically, some activists of the new generation have also become more anti-establishment and particularistic in orientation. Student movements in Hong Kong after the 1989 Beijing democracy movement bore a new generation of activists who were more anti-establishment, inclined to less formal and more spontaneous modes of action, who preferred to distance themselves from electoral politicians (see also Chapter Six). In short, they were more likely to buy into "new social movements" ideas. Affected by civil society theories of action which had been in vogue since the late 1980s, they were more inclined to disengage themselves from the formal political institutions such as political parties and elected councils. With many of these student activists taking up positions in liberal CSOs in the 1990s, the CSOs became more single-issue-oriented, had a tendency to shy away from mainstream politics, and had a lower propensity to form territorywide coalitions on issues of broader concern than their predecessors. They also had more of a "not-in-my-backyard" mentality, seeing specific policy issues as concerns of individual communities and not broader problems of societal development and reform (Lui and Chiu, 2000, p. 13; Lai, 2000) . Ideologically they preferred to have a more pluralistic movement, confronting the establishment on various fronts based on equal participation. They more-or-less refused to accept leadership of the older generation of mainstream democrats, and preferred a more diversified movement form, partly for fear that the movement agenda would be usurped by the mainstream democrats.
1 These activists also tended to see the elected councilors as part of the establishment, who should be monitored by civil society, and not as their partners in social movements. To them, the social movements needed to keep a distance from the elected politicians, to maintain the autonomy of the civil society.
Events in the early 1990s also widened the gap between political parties and some of the grassroots CSOs. Chapter Seven has discussed a series of events in the early 1990s in which activists used more confrontational actions to embarrass government officials. For the mainstream democrats who were appealing for the interests of the broader electorate, the actions had become too radical and they were generally reluctant to stand behind these more radical movements. The grassroots activists in turn saw this as betrayal of the social movement and a desertion of the pro-grassroots position by the party politicians. Movements such as rehousing those living in rooftop structures in Tsuen Wan and Mongkok in 1994-95, which the pro-democracy parties failed to endorse, were watershed events after which the grassroots activists increasingly deserted the pro-democracy parties out of disappointment. The Democratic Party also grew increasingly middle-class-oriented after 1997, 2 which partly contributed to its detachment from the pro-democracy unions and other grassroots groups. After 1997, the links between CSOs and the political society were severed, with little mutual trust between them. The two became more and more specialized: the political parties focusing on the parliamentary and electoral arena, while many liberal CSOs did not believe that the partly elected councils were important battlefields. They preferred to focus on their sporadic, particularistic, issue-oriented actions in their own issue areas. It also became relatively uncommon for CSOs and political groups to form territory-wide coalitions or movements after 1997, as they often did in the late 1980s.
Counter united fronts
The detachment of civil society from the political society did not mean that the social movements in Hong Kong died down after 1997; they just took on new forms of organization. Table 7 .5 shows that after 1997, there were more than 2, 000 public meetings and processions every year, an average of 6.4 per day, most of them protests against government policies or expressions of policy demands. On the one hand, this shows that despite some selective use of power of control by the government and a less favorable political climate, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the freedom of association and expression in Hong Kong was largely intact.
3 On the other hand, it showed that public protests had become one of the most common forms of expression of opinion and social movement in Hong Kong after 1997. At one point, public protests were so frequent that the international media nicknamed Hong Kong "the city of protests" (Washington Post, June 28, 2000, p. A21).
Post-1997 events showed that the CSOs had been active in using social protests to put forward policy demands, fight for their interests, and oppose government actions and policies, especially on cases of perceived infringement by the state on civil society. Chapter Seven discussed a series of cases when attempts to encroach on press freedom and civil liberties were met with opposition from the civil society (see Appendix 3). CSOs were generally alert to protect the autonomy and space of the civil society after 1997, and were quick to voice opposition whenever they perceived any threats or encroachments on civil society. Human rights activists and pro-democracy politicians were allies in defending civil liberties and political freedoms, while professional bodies such as the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Hong Kong Bar Association played an important role in defending press freedom and rule of law. The religious sector was also adamant in defending religious freedom and the freedom of speech. For example, in 2000 the Vatican canonized 120 foreign missionaries and Chinese Catholics martyred in China, a move not welcomed by the PRC government. A CGLO official asked the Hong Kong Catholic Church to adopt a low-key approach in their celebrations, which was promptly reported by the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, accusing the Chinese government of infringing religious freedom and went ahead with the celebration. 4 In the case of the Falun Gong, which was accused by both the pro-Beijing circles and the SAR government of being an "evil cult" in 2000-01, 5 the Christian churches stood firm in its defense.
The vibrant civil society and vocal CSOs of Hong Kong were a key factor in defending autonomy and liberty of Hong Kong after 1997 (Holliday, Ma and Yep, 2002) . The watchful eyes of foreign governments and the international media certainly played a part, as both the SAR and the Central Government did not want to tarnish Hong Kong's international reputation as a free city, or contradict "one country, two systems" and "high autonomy." However, with very limited resources, weak linkage between CSOs, little collaboration with the political parties or elected legislators, and only a partly elected legislature in an executive-dominant system, it was difficult for the CSOs to effect changes in government policies.
This deficiency in post-1997 social movements was partly attributed to the movement organization form. The post-1997 movement industry saw the rise of ad hoc united fronts formed by CSOs in various areas. Most social activists interviewed by the author said that this organizational form began to become popular in the mid-1990s. 6 CSOs with similar concerns would join together to form a temporary coalition or a "united front" for a series of actions, usually over a certain policy issue, cause or incident. These coalitions usually had no formal organization and little organizational resources. For example, they usually did not have regular paid staff, and usually did not even register as formal organizations or registered societies. The ad hoc united fronts usually last only months, and became inactive after the passing of the issue or the series of actions.
A quantitative survey on the social movement after 1997 showed that this kind of ad hoc united front was very common after 1997. Based on newspaper reports from January 1998 to December 2004, 7 I counted the frequency of social actions (including street-level protests, signature campaigns, press conferences, public declarations of positions, petitions to the government or Legco, legal actions, etc.) in Hong Kong that involved CSOs in the name of "coalitions," "joint conferences," "united fronts," etc. (see Appendix 5 for the list of coalitions). The results revealed a total of 190 such coalitions or united fronts acting during this period. Altogether these coalitions accounted for 700 counts of social actions, on average 100 social actions every year.
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There were several interesting observations from this survey of "counter united front" actions. Firstly, a large number of them had very limited counts of social actions in a span of seven years. There were 70 fronts (or 36.8% of total) that had only one action count in 1998-2004. Another 88 fronts (46.3% of total) had no more than five actions, which means 83.1% of these fronts had no more than five actions in this period that spanned seven years (see Table 8 .1). It was not difficult to explain the phenomenon: many of these fronts were ad hoc alliances formed for targeted actions against a specific event or government policy proposal. After the proposal was dropped or adopted these coalitions would naturally cease to operate. The second observation was that these "counter united fronts" covered a wide range of issues, including education, social welfare, unemployment/poverty, human rights, democratic development, to medical issues, with no dominant policy areas (see Table 8 .2). This shows that the format was favored by a large range of CSOs in different sectors. Thirdly, street-level protests, including public demonstrations, rallies or petitions, remained the most popular form of social action. Out of the 700 counts of social actions, 351 or about 50% belonged to this category. It should be noted that direct contact with legislators or officials made up only 53 or 7.6% of the total action counts. It showed that most CSOs still saw arousing public attention and earning public sympathy through the mass media as more important than simply taking the message or demand to those in the establishment. This more or less revealed that the CSOs had little confidence on the effectiveness of the formal channels of complaints and consultation.
On the face of it, this mushrooming of counter united fronts, covering such a wide range of issues, was a manifestation of societal pluralism. However, these ad hoc united fronts usually could not accumulate enough resources for sustained movements to effect government policy changes. The fronts would raise objections to a specific proposal by various actions, maybe forcing the government to reconsider the issue if they succeeded in arousing enough public attention, but they usually could not sustain their participation and organization after the initial flurry was over. Among the 190 counter united fronts, only 15 had ten or more social actions within seven years. Six of them belonged to coalitions of prograssroots CSOs, which joined hands to demand better social welfare (or against cutting of welfare) and better protection to the lower class. Two of them were coalitions of small political groups that demanded the resignation of CE Tung Chee-hwa in 2002-04. Two of the coalitions campaigned on causes of antidiscrimination, and the Civil Human Rights Front (see below) was a large umbrella organization of many different groups. These more active and persistent coalitions had one thing in common: they had a core of more established CSOs, usually political groups or grassroots CSOs, which enabled them to sustain the movement for a longer period of time. Veteran social activists interviewed by the author, who had participated in more than one of these action fronts, pointed out the strengths and limitations of the counter united fronts as an organizational form. It was flexible and did not require a lot of organizational resources. As the CSOs stressed equal participation and were very conscious of their own identities, the lack of a common and stable organization allowed the members to withdraw any time. They could join a front if they wanted to participate in a certain action or issue, and if the issue was over, and/or the course of action or purpose of the united front had changed, they could withdraw from the coalition without any significant costs. They did not need to fear that the common organization would be usurped or dominated by some larger organizations, and even if that happened they could easily withdraw. The choice of this organizational form more or less reflected a lack of mutual trust among CSOs, especially with regard to the larger and more established CSOs and the political groups. It also reflected that the CSOs did not care much to institutionalize or formalize their movements, as their most important concern was self-defense: defending their self-interest and values, the autonomy of CSOs and the civil society as a whole from encroachment from the establishment.
The struggle against Article 23
The movement against Article 23 legislation best illustrates the strengths and limitations of the counter united fronts as a movement organizational form. The struggle against Article 23 in 2002-03 was a case of civil society in self-defense against perceived encroachment by the state. It marked a rare occasion after 1997 in which CSOs of different natures joined together in a territory-wide, loosely organized counter united front, the Civil Human Rights Front(CHRF). The movement saw better cooperation between the CSOs and the political society, culminating in the largest indigenous social movement in Hong Kong history.
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The movement also fundamentally transformed post-1997 politics and rekindled the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The experience of CHRF showed both the potential and limitations of this organizational form of loose united fronts.
Background
For many social activists in Hong Kong, legislation related to Article 23 of the Basic Law has been a sword of Damocles hanging over them since 1989. Article 23 of the Basic Law reads: "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies." The article emanated from Beijing's changed attitude to Hong Kong after the Beijing democracy movement in 1989. In the first draft of the Basic Law in April 1988, the draft Article 22 read: "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall prohibit by law any act designed to undermine national unity or subvert the Central People's Government" (Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, 2001). The enthusiastic support of the Hong Kong citizens for the 1989 Beijing democracy movement alarmed the Central Government, which dreaded Hong Kong becoming a base to subvert the mainland socialist system. The draft Article 22 was then revised in 1989-90 to proscribe a wider range of activities so that "subversive" acts in Hong Kong could be outlawed after 1997 (Roberti, 1994, p. 275) .
Because of this, in the minds of Hong Kong people, Article 23 of the Basic Law was naturally associated with the Tiananmen crackdown. Since 1989, the Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (ASPDMC) had been organizing annual candlelight vigils in commemoration of the Tiananmen crackdown, in which tens of thousands of participants chanted: "End one-party dictatorship." Pro-democracy activists had always feared that such events might constitute "subversion" under Article 23. However, Article 23 reads "the HKSAR shall enact laws on its own," meaning the content and timing of the legislation should be decided by the SAR government. Facing internal opposition and a possible tarnishing of its international image, the SAR government procrastinated and did not propose legislation for years after 1997.
However, by 2002 the Beijing leaders seemed to think that Hong Kong had waited long enough and openly reminded Hong Kong leaders the need to enact laws related to Article 23. In early 2002, Li Peng, then NPC Chairman said openly while it was "understandable" that the SAR government had not yet enacted Article 23 laws, the task should be realized within Tung's second term (2002-07) (Apple Daily, February 28, 2002, p. A2) . Vice Premier Qian Qichen echoed and contended that Falun Gong should be banned in Hong Kong after Article 23 laws were enacted (Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 26, 2002, p. 2) . In September 2002, the SAR government released a consultation document Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law, outlying proposed law changes and new enactments related to Article 23. After three months of consultation, the proposals were revised and written into the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, which was tabled to Legco in February 2003.
The government proposals aroused a lot of criticism, especially from human right activists, legal professionals, and pro-democracy activists. It is not within the purview of this book to recapitulate the full contents of and all the controversies around the proposed legislation. 10 In general the opponents of the bill, with some of them agreeing to the constitutional or security need to enact laws to protect national security of China, considered the proposed offences to be overbroad, with key terms so loosely defined and the offences too all-encompassing that the enacted law could be arbitrarily used by the authorities to curb peaceful dissidence in Hong Kong (Ma, 2005b) . Many Hong Kong people were at least uneasy about the introduction of mainland national security concepts into Hong Kong, and had little trust for the Central Government when it came to respecting human rights or political dissidence. Opinion polls showed that by December 2002, 54% of Hong Kong people were opposed to the government proposals, with only 20% supporting (Ming Pao Daily News, December 14, 2002, p. A10) .
The CHRF as counter united front
For many pro-democracy or liberal CSOs, legislating for Article 23 was an attempt by the government to control civil society and curtail public space. On September 13, 2002, more than 30 social activist groups formed the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF). Some other groups joined later to bring the total number to 44 groups by July 2003. The CHRF was meant to be a roundtable conference that could serve as a platform for groups concerned with human rights issues to discuss actions, but when the consultation document on Article 23 legislation was released weeks later, the CHRF quickly focused its attention on Article 23.
The CHRF typified the organization, strengths and limitations of the counter united front as a movement organization format. The member groups were highly diversified, with quite different backgrounds and different views on Article 23 legislation. The 44 groups that had joined CHRF by July 2003 included human rights groups (four of the 44), political groups/parties (ten), professional unions (three), religious groups (six), labor groups (four), student groups (three), feminist, gay and lesbian groups (seven). The more radical groups such as the April 5th Movement (a local Trotskyist group) rejected any kind of national security legislation. The human rights groups did not see a need to legislate for China's national security in Hong Kong, especially when the SAR government was not democratically elected. More moderate members such as the Democratic Party agreed in principle to enact Article 23 laws, but demanded that the government should publish a draft legislation for consultation, in the form of a white bill, before tabling the legislative proposals to Legco.
The operation of the CHRF resembled many of these loose united fronts of liberal CSOs after 1997. It operated in the spirit of internal democracy and equal participation. Most decisions on collective actions were decided in plenary meetings, participated by all the member groups, in which each member group had one vote. More established members, such as the DP that had 11 Legco members in 2002-03, or the Hong Kong Professional Teachers Union that had about 80,000 members by 2003, had the same voting rights as the non-registered Hong Kong Voice of Democracy that had only several members. The CHRF only had one full-time paid staffer throughout the campaign against Article 23, and all its activities were manned by volunteers of the member groups.
The mainstream democrats, most notably the DP, who used to lead the democracy movement and political movements in the 1980s, took a backseat this time. The DP thought the struggle against Article 23 could be used to rekindle the democracy movement, to show to Hong Kong people that a nonelected government could pass laws that inhibit freedom. They also thought that even if the National Security Bill was going to pass Legco, its passing would inflict a hefty political penalty on their pro-Beijing political rivals who supported the legislation.
11 However, the DP adopted a conscious strategy to refrain from taking the leadership in this movement. After their setback in the 2000 Legco election, the DP intended to establish better links with CSOs. They understood that quite a few CSOs had deep mistrust and suspicions of political parties in general, and of the DP in particular, and a DP-led movement would not attract their participation. Many younger activists would not accept their leadership, or they were reluctant to accept any leadership whatsoever. The DP saw the CHRF format as one that could enlist the support of more CSOs in a movement for a general cause, as the days were gone when civil groups would accept a centralized leadership by the older generation of leaders.
12 Thus the DP participated in the CHRF just as a general member group and did not try to take the leadership, although it played vital roles in both the Legco arena and in street-level mobilization (see below).
New forms of mobilization
The CHRF experience epitomized a pluralistic form of mobilization by the new generation of social movement. Because the bill covered a wide range of areas, it aroused concerns from various social sectors (which partly explained the wide variety of groups in the CHRF). Human rights activists and pro-democracy politicians were ever critical of the contents of the government proposals, seeing them as detrimental to civil liberties. Journalists were afraid that they could easily be guilty of "sedition" or "theft of state secrets" with the vague definitions in the bill. Academics feared that normal research on China could constitute "theft of state secrets," and discussions on Tibet or Taiwan independence could become "inciting secession," hurting academic freedom. The Catholic Church was worried about the proscription of links with "mainland political organizations," as they had a lot of links with underground churches in the mainland. The Falun Gong Hong Kong chapter participated in earnest as they naturally saw themselves as the first target of the legislation. Even university librarians were worried that they could easily be guilty of "handling seditious publications" and petitioned against the content of the consultation document.
13
The wide range of opinions among member groups mean that it was difficult for the CHRF to reach a consensus on many positional issues, including whether or not to ask for a white bill for another round of consultation by the end of 2002. The only consensus was that the member groups objected to the proposals in the consultation document and the subsequent bill, since they generally believed that it would hurt human rights.
14 The united front format, however, allowed the different groups to "agree to disagree," and to devise their own action plans and mobilize their own publics without agreeing on a common position or a concerted course of action, under the overall vague banner of "opposing Article 23 legislation."
The Catholic Church opposed the legislation in a high-profile manner, with Prelate Bishop Joseph Zen criticizing the government proposals as hurting religious freedom and trying to silence political opposition. With the green light given by the bishop, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (JPCOM), the Catholic body responsible for campaigns for social justice and a CHRF member, organized discussions on Article 23 in individual churches. 15 The Church weekly Kung Kao Po carried commentaries from Bishop Zen and other clergy, asserting that the proposed legislation would damage religious and other freedoms in Hong Kong.
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The news media as an interested party played a role in stirring opposition. Journalists generally feared that the law could be used against them, or at least would instill a "chilling effect," inducing journalists to toe the government line. A survey of Hong Kong journalists in December 2002 showed that 59% of interviewed journalists were opposed to Article 23 legislation, with about 80% believing that it would hurt the freedom of reporting. About 10% said they would quit the profession after the bill was passed, and 34% said they would "consider doing so" (Apple Daily, December 21, 2002, p. A6). The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) began a petition against Article 23 legislation in November 2002, which obtained the support of 26 international media and human rights groups and 859 local journalists (Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 25, 2002, p. 8) .
Selected newspapers played special roles in this struggle. Both owned by maverick media tycoon Jimmy Lai, the pro-democracy Apple Daily and Next Magazine led the opinion battle against Article 23. Both were relentless in attacking the government and openly called on the public to join the July 1 demonstration. A survey of the participants of the July 1 march showed that about 50% of them usually read the Apple Daily, testifying its role of opinion leadership (Chan and Chung, 2003) . The owners of the Hong Kong Economic Journal, the most influential financial daily in Hong Kong which many believed was read daily by Beijing leaders, said they would consider selling or folding the paper if the National Security Bill was passed, raising eyebrows in the business community (Sing Tao Daily News, July 5, 2003, p. A6; Ming Pao Daily News, July 4, 2003, p. A6) .
The pro-democracy parties and legislators took up the battle in the parliamentary arena. The National Security Bill was tabled to Legco in February 2003, which was quickly passed to the bill committee for detailed scrutiny. With the pro-government members in the majority, the pro-democracy legislators knew very well that it was very likely the bill would be passed. They tried their best to expose the bill's loopholes in the bill committee meetings. In the 180 hours of committee meetings on the National Security Bill, the lengthy questioning of the contents and controversies of the bill by the pro-democracy legislators led to occasional outbursts by government officials in the chamber, which served to add fuel to the already burning opposition movement. The DP also played an important role in street-level mobilization. At the district level, the 94 ward offices of DP legislators and district councilors proved an important organizational resource. In weeks of mobilization effort shortly before the July 1 demonstration, the DP managed to collect phone numbers of about 40,000 supporters, and their volunteers and staff called them up one by one to ask them to join the July 1 demonstration.
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Selected professional bodies played an important role in cognitive mobilization during the campaign. The Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) and some of the leading barristers made serious efforts to explain the problems with the bill in public forums and in the media. In later stages they reached out to other professional bodies and secondary schools to explain the problems with the bill. 18 In the last two weeks of June 2003, more and more professional groups and social leaders, including academics, journalist bodies, medical doctors, schoolteachers, accountants, social workers, film directors, artists, student bodies, and religious groups, openly called on their members and the public to join the July 1 protest. To analyze the form of mobilization and the role of CSOs in the Article 23 movement, I conducted a survey of press reports related to anti-Article 23 legislation activities in June-July 2003. 19 The survey revealed that in the month June 2003, 162 groups had openly urged support for the July 1 protest by issuing public statements or newspaper advertisements.
A lot of the mobilization was done by ordinary people through interpersonal channels and through the Internet. Ng Chin-pong was a Form Six student in June 2003, student union president of his own secondary school. One week before July 1, he got the impression from various newsgroups and Internet chatrooms commonly visited by teenagers that many teenagers were really angry about Article 23 legislation. He then set up a website to call on fellow secondary school students to march together on July 1, 2003, and spread the message on various teenagerfavored websites, newsgroups or chatrooms. Within one week he got more than 100 volunteers, whom he had not known before, who helped to relay the message through their own Internet and interpersonal networks. On July 1, 2003, more than 2,000 teenagers showed up at the meeting point for secondary school students, and they marched together.
A survey of 1,154 participants of the 2003 July 1 demonstration showed that 68% of them saw interpersonal influences as an important factor that motivated them to join the march, while 54% saw "calls from the Internet" (including electronic mails from friends) as important. Both channels had higher percentages than "calls from family members" (51%) and "calls from political parties" (44%) (Chan and Chung, 2003, p. 9) . This showed that mobilization through the Internet, a channel that was difficult for the authorities to control, and which bypassed the mainstream mass media, had become a new and important channel of communication in social movements in Hong Kong. The organizational resources of the CHRF were not major factors that led to the formidable movement; there was no single overriding organization that was capable of mobilizing half a million people onto the street. Civic awareness, opinion leadership by social leaders and the media, and interpersonal networking were mostly responsible for the large turnout on July 1, 2003. The general dissatisfaction with SAR governance, especially its performance in handling the SARS epidemic in March-May 2003, was of course a key motivation. The general distrust of the Hong Kong people of the Central Government and the SAR governments, concerning how they would use the overbroad national security legislation, underlined the apprehension against the Article 23 legislation. This distrust or fear had a lot to do with post-1997 events discussed in Chapter Seven, which led the Hong Kong people to believe that the government was intent on clamping down on dissidence. The fear exploded in its most dramatic form during the Article 23 debate.
Limitations of the united front format
In terms of stopping Article 23 legislation, the CHRF was certainly effective, as in September 2003 the government announced that they would not propose the Article 23 legislation again to Legco in the near future. However, when the mainstream democrats and some of the pro-democracy CSOs in the CHRF tried to convert the anti-Article 23 movement into a full-fledged democracy movement after the July 2003 march, and use CHRF as its vehicle, its limitations were quickly exposed.
The mainstream democrats and the pro-democracy CSOs wasted little time in linking the Article 23 episode to the slow democratic development in Hong Kong. They argued that the SAR government could choose to ignore public opinion and enact legislations that violated human rights precisely because it was not democratically-elected. With most of the functionally-elected Legco members supporting the government, the democrats also argued that Legco was not able to truly reflect public opinion because it was not fully popularly-elected. The democrats immediately faced difficulties when they tried to transform the CHRF into a new coalition for pushing democratization. Immediately after the July 2003 march, when some CHRF members proposed to set the new task of the CHRF as demanding full democracy, some of the member groups were reluctant to join. Many of these groups did not have a history of participating in social or political movements and did not feel right to do so after Article 23 was defeated. For example, the Hong Kong Journalists Association considered itself a professional body, and saw it inappropriate for it to join as a member of a coalition fighting for democracy. The Hong Kong chapter of Amnesty International, following the principle set by its headquarters, did not want to join domestic political campaigns. Quite a few of the grassroots CSOs were afraid that the movement and the CHRF platform would be exploited by the mainstream democrats to push their political agendas. Some grassroots CSOs were wary that the movement would quickly be transformed to one of chiefly political or constitutional concern, paying little attention to livelihood or class issues. They were also unhappy that the July 1 movement was portrayed as a middle-class movement, neglecting the role played by the grassroots groups. 20 The member groups hence failed to agree that they should become a full-fledged united front to push democratic reforms.
The landslide victory of the democrats in the district council election of November 2003 and the large turnout of the January 1, 2004 rally gave great encouragement to the democrats. The Central Government's propaganda on patriotism in early 2004 drove the CHRF together, as the debate heightened political pressure on the pro-democracy camp as a whole, and focused the public's attention on political issues. However, the CHRF still failed to consolidate into a more formal organization, resembling the Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government, formed by various pro-democracy groups in the late 1980s. In mid-2004, it was proposed that it should register under the Societies Ordinance to formalize the organization as a longer-term movement for fighting for civil and political rights. The idea was discussed in a CHRF general meeting, but in the end was turned down by the members on August 14, 2004. It showed the extent to which some of the member groups detested formalization and preferred an ad hoc form of organization. Core participants of the CHRF revealed that many of the smaller groups were afraid that a formal organization would be dominated by the larger and more resourceful groups. They also did not want to devote their resources and time to a common secretariat or formal organization. The mutual trust between these smaller CSOs and the mainstream democrats was too weak to form a long-term partnership.
21 Some of the member groups thought the CHRF should focus on human rights rather than political or constitutional issues, but groups such as the Human Rights Monitor wanted to maintain their independence and did not want to be a member of another formal organization, preferring to keep the ad hoc form of organization, which would allow them to leave the movement any time should they find it deviating from their goals.
However, this ad hoc organization form proved unable to sustain the movement. After with some of the more established groups less participative, the CHRF was embroiled in a series of internal struggles. The most illustrative case was the debate around the 2005 July 1 demonstration. The CHRF general meeting decided gay and lesbian groups would be among the leaders of the procession of the 2005 march, which brought opposition from religious member groups. Some member groups opined that not allowing gay and lesbian groups to lead the procession constitute discrimination against these groups, precisely behaviors and attitudes that the CHRF needed to fight against. In the end, the member groups failed to persuade each other: the gay and lesbian groups were among the leaders of the procession, leading to a part-boycott of the religious groups in the 2005 march.
The CHRF experience partly explained the plight of the civil society and democratic development in Hong Kong. Although the civil society in Hong Kong was vibrant and pluralistic, it traditionally had relatively weak organizational resources and weak horizontal linkage among CSOs. While the pressure groups in the 1970s and 1980s shared a similar reformist orientation and could easily coalesce into territory-wide movements, the evolution of the local social and political movements since the 1980s pushed the CSOs towards a more principled and ethical view of civil society, while driving a wedge between them and the political groups that were intent on institutional reform and grabbing political power. The lack of mutual trust between CSOs and political parties made it difficult for them to form a territory-wide formalized organization or movement to push for progressive democratic reforms. The ideological orientations of the CSOs predetermined that they would be content with self-defense and maintenance or at most enlargement of the public space, instead of seeking more fundamental institutional reforms. The ad hoc united front format as a movement organizational form was hence a conscious choice of the CSOs bounded by their ideologies. The flexible movement form allowed the participants to join and leave as they chose, with relatively little costs and long term commitment.
Core CHRF participants reflected on the weakness of this organizational form in leading a territory-wide movement. While the flexible and organic form allowed maximum participation of groups from different sectors and ideological flavors, it would fail to establish a stable core. Without a stable and resourceful core, the front was very dependent on the political climate or the initiative of individual resourceful groups, making it difficult to sustain a movement for long periods of time. 22 The form was effective as a short-term alliance to fend off encroachment on the civil society, as shown in the Article 23 struggle. It was effective as it allowed CSOs to mobilize their respective clienteles with relatively low costs, with due respect to their individual differences. It was however difficult for this organizational form to accumulate enough organizational resources, experience or mutual trust to build a formidable movement. The participation from civil society was bound to be more sporadic, spontaneous, more dependent on the initiative of individual participants, while at the same time making it difficult to effect institutional changes.
